Substance Matters

In the preliminary edition of its Economic Outlook No. 86 released November 19, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, emphasized that raising corporate income taxes is not only the wrong answer for cash-strapped governments in the current economic environment but that approach will inherently impede a recovery.

From the report:

“Most taxes have adverse effects on economic performance by distorting incentives to work, save and invest. Raising taxes therefore could be costly. Indeed, GDP could fall by 1 to 1.5% if the overall tax/income ratio were increased to provide revenue equal to 2% of GDP (OECD, 2003). A rise in the tax ratio would be particularly harmful if it was concentrated on corporate or labour income taxes; increasing indirect taxes and taxes on immovable property would be much less costly. In particular, the estimates in Arnold (2008) suggest that the economic cost of raising government revenue by increasing taxes on labour income could be up to five times higher than that from raising the same amount of revenue from higher indirect taxes.”

Raising a corporate tax rate that is already the second highest among the G20 will push more companies – and therefore jobs – out of the U.S. At the very time that unemployment is reaching new highs in America, the tax policy put forth by Congress to pay for health care reform is forcing jobs overseas. Cutting the corporate tax rate will create jobs and expand the dwindling individual tax base. The issue is not figuring out how to divide the proverbial pie, but rather how to expand it.

Oxford Analytica, an independent, privately held firm specializing in providing scholarly analysis of world developments for business and government leaders, published an excellent article this past Friday on the coordinated attack on tax havens by the OECD and G20 countries.

An excerpt:

Singapore today signed a protocol with France that brings the two countries’ bilateral tax treaty into line with the OECD standard on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. This is the twelfth agreement it has signed in accordance with the OECD standard, thereby moving Singapore into the category of jurisdictions deemed to have substantially implemented the standard. This required that Singapore pass legislation to enable its authorities to exchange information, including bank and fiduciary information, with tax authorities in other countries.

Tax havens. Tax havens are not merely jurisdictions with nil or low tax rates; many countries attract business in this way. Explicit appellation is also misleading: for example, the OECD has never defined Singapore, nor Switzerland, as a ‘tax haven.’ The critical aspect of a tax haven is non-cooperation with other jurisdictions in the realm of tax information, and implicitly offering a refuge for tax evaders and money-laundering.

G20. The big economies are now pressing for compliance in transparency as a tool to put pressure on tax and asset-management aspects of tax havens. In practice, the main issue is use of tax havens for aggressive tax competition and homes for asset management in offshore funds:

• In 2009, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that 83 of the largest 100 US corporations were doing business in tax havens.
• The US Treasury estimated it was losing 100 billion dollars in revenue per annum.

Market fundamentalism. Growth of tax havens was possible mainly because, in the absence of global cooperation, piecemeal regulatory efforts would merely push business from one tax haven to another. In the prevailing climate of market fundamentalism, banks successfully argued that they needed freedom to organise their affairs. That time is over. The list of those who had not made “substantial progress” (ie had not signed twelve individual tax information exchange agreements with other jurisdictions) shrank by 15 in the April-November period:

• All jurisdictions of relevance have committed to tax transparency standards.
• About 20 small states remain to implement their commitments and seven larger economies have yet to do so.

There’s no question that OECD and G20 countries see tax havens as the enemy of their tax revenue. However, dismantling those regimes may have an unexpected, adverse effect on the capital markets. In the short-run, the cost of capital will likely rise in real terms impeding economic expansion as business and consumers find they are unable to afford the capital markets’ prevailing rates. Under this scenario an increase in inflation would also be likely as businesses would have to raise prices to obtain needed capital. Perversely, the very governments in the vanguard of the movement to dismantle tax havens would likely find themselves the most adversely impacted. Governments who have been running deficits will find the cost of funding those deficits as a percentage of their GDP will increase sharply, due to constraints being placed on the capital markets.

Ultimately, tax havens are a symptom of a much larger problem. Developed countries’ governments have grown to such gargantuan proportions that they must continually squeeze taxpayers to fund themselves. Corporations and individuals are essentially paying for the privilege of being taxed. Tax havens exist because there is a market for them. Contracting government, creating and implementing tax policies which align corporate and governmental interests, and efficient enforcement of existing rules is the better, albeit less sexy, answer.

Buried deep in the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962) passed late last Saturday night by the U.S. House of Representatives are three pieces of tax legislation that have the potential to do for multinational enterprises what Sauron’s little gold ring did for Middle Earth: create tumult and uncertainty. Every tax professional needs to be aware of this legislation. While the likelihood of the health care bill passing in its current incarnation may be low, these tax proposals aren’t going away. Someway, somehow they will be passed and so tax pros must be prepared to address them.

Section 561: Limitation on Treaty Benefits for Certain Deductible Payments

• What it says: “In the case of any deductible (U.S. source item of fixed, determinable, annual, or periodic (“FDAP”) income ) related-party payment, directly or indirectly, any withholding tax imposed under chapter 3 (and any tax imposed under subpart A or B of this part) with respect to such payment may not be reduced under any treaty of the United States unless any such withholding tax would be reduced under a treaty of the United States if such payment were made directly to the foreign parent corporation.” [Emphasis added]
• What it means: 1) The stock ownership threshold for what it means to be a controlled party under IRC section 1563(a)(1) is reduced from “at least 80 percent” to “more than 50 percent”, 2) Withholding taxes cannot be reduced under a U.S.-treaty, unless a direct-payment to the foreign parent corporation would also qualify for such reduced rate of withholding tax. Clearly, the aim is to shut-down inverted companies with inbound financing structures. Given the broad nature of the proposal, however, the collateral consequences may not have been fully considered, as it appears to be a “super-limitation-on-benefits” provision to redress real or perceived abuses in cross-border financing structures. It will likely be more of a clarion call for U.S. trading partners to cry foul, akin to the FIRPTA provisions on the 1980s with respect to treaty benefits. At a time when multinational enterprises are seeking certainty in their cross-border affairs it will likely throw a monkey-wrench in planning and (as currently drafted) have unintended consequences.

Section 562: Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, Penalties

• What it says: “In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if – (A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”
• What it means: The Economic Substance Doctrine, heretofore an amorphous standard molded by the judiciary, would now be on the books as law. Essentially, the government would have a weapon to combat perceived tax shelters even if the taxpayer was technically compliant with relevant law and historical precedent. The language is highly subjective and ambiguous. Given that taxpayers already have the burden of proof, codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine raises the bar even higher, requiring justification not only of the transaction from a legal standpoint, but also from a business and economic position as well both qualitatively and qualitatively and leaves the door open to questions in the event the non-tax aspects of the transaction are unrealized or realized to a lesser degree than anticipated. In addition, the “Reasonable Cause and Good Faith” exceptions under IRC section 6664, would be amended to exclude transactions for which “Economic Substance” was lacking and for tax-shelters. In addition, IRC section 6662 would be amended to increase the 20 percent penalty, to 40 percent for non-disclosed non-economic substance transactions.

Section 563: Certain Large or Publicly Traded Persons Made Subject to a More Likely Than Not Standard for Avoiding Penalties on Underpayments

• What it says: “In the case of any specified person, paragraph (1) shall apply to the portion of an underpayment which is attributable to any item only if such person has a reasonable belief that the tax treatment of such item by such person is more likely than not the proper tax treatment of such item.”
• What it means: Instead of the “substantial authority” standard or reasonable basis plus disclosure test of current law, transactions would be subject to a “more likely than not” (“MLTN”) test. If this proposed legislation is made law in its current form, companies may have to accrue for additional penalties under FIN 48 for positions taken on a tax return where the position did not meet MLTN under the proposed legislation. It effectively raises the bar on affected taxpayers with respect to the current penalty regime under section 6662 by amending the “Reasonable Cause” provisions of section 6664. As currently drafted, the proposed change would pick up privately held corporations with $100 million or more of gross receipts and publicly traded persons.

At a recent presentation in Texas, Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs in the U.S. Treasury Department, was asked about the likelihood of the U.S. adopting a Federal consumption tax.

In response, Mr. Shay avoided the question completely stating that the policy must be carefully evaluated in context. His point: The U.S. relies more heavily on corporate tax receipts as compared with the other G20 nations; thus, it is unlikely the U.S. would adopt a consumption-based system at the Federal level. In other words, since we are already so good at pillaging corporate taxpayers, why do we need to branch out and further pillage individuals?

If only it were so simple.

The Congressional Budget Office forecasts a continued decline in U.S. corporate tax receipts – due to, among other things, the U.S. having the second-highest corporate tax rate in the developed world, lack of available capital and general economic malaise.

So, if 1) corporate tax receipts are declining and 2) a Federal consumption tax is not on the menu, what’s left? Perhaps Mr. Shay’s position presages the Administration’s likely next move – despite statements to the contrary – to seek repeal of deferral of non-U.S. earnings, so that there would be current taxation and a likely residual U.S. tax, since many of those earnings are subject to rates of taxation below the U.S.’ current confiscatory 35% rate?

In the immortal words of Han Solo, “I’ve got a bad feeling about this.”

The U.S. government is inefficient and overrun with bureaucracy. The current direction of U.S. tax policy – a confiscatory corporate tax-rate – will continue to stifle job growth and constrain Foreign Direct Investment. The U.S. needs to follow the lead of Canada, Ireland, the UK, and other trading partners who have reduced corporate taxes as a means of stimulating employment and GDP growth. Every 1% point drop in the corporate tax rate translates into a 0.1% increase in GDP.

Given the wealth of empirical and anecdotal evidence, and despite Mr. Shay’s statement to the contrary, we believe the Federal consumption tax option must remain in play.